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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Atlantic City Electric Company (the “Company”), a 
public utility that provides electricity in southern New Jersey, 
seeks our review of a decision by the National Labor Relations 
Board (the “Board”) finding that the Company violated 
Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(the “Act”) by refusing to bargain with a unit representing the 
Company’s system operators.  Because the Board’s 
determination is supported by substantial evidence, we will 
deny the Company’s petition for review and grant the Board’s 




The Company operates an electrical system from a 
central dispatch in Mays Landing, New Jersey, known as the 
4 
 
control room.1  From the control room, sixteen system 
operators and fifteen dispatchers manage the Company’s 
electrical transmission and facilitate planned and unplanned 
field work.2  Outside the control room, the Company deploys 
about 300 field employees who maintain and repair the 
Company’s equipment.   
 
System operators work with a computer program to 
oversee and remotely control the Company’s transmission 
system.  They prioritize work needs and resources, in 
consultation with Company guidelines, both for planned 
maintenance as well as for power restoration during outages. 
While system operators determine the need for work, field 
supervisors select crews to undertake it—though the parties 
dispute the extent to which system operators can require that a 
crew dispatch to a particular site or remain on site.   System 
operators also prepare and communicate switching instructions 
for field employees to follow when de-energizing equipment 
so that maintenance and repair work can be done safely. 
 
The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
Local 210 (the “Union”) represents a unit of Company 
 
1 We base this background on the undisputed portions of the 
decision that the Board’s Regional Director issued in this case.   
2 The Company designates system operators who manage 
lower-voltage systems as “system operators” and those who 
manage higher-voltage systems as “senior system operators.”  
App. 27.  Other than the difference in voltage, the two groups 




employees.3  The Union petitioned the Board for an election to 
determine whether system operators would join the existing 
bargaining unit.  The Company opposed the inclusion of 
system operators on the basis that they were supervisors within 
the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.4  If system operators 
are supervisors, they are not “employee[s]” under the Act and 
are therefore not “entitled to the Act’s protections [or] 
includable in a bargaining unit.”5   
 
The parties presented evidence before a Board hearing 
officer in February of 2017.  Following the hearing, the 
Board’s Regional Director issued a decision finding that 
system operators were not supervisors and directing the 
Company to conduct a self-determination election.  In that 
election, the system operators voted against joining the 
bargaining unit.  The following year, the Union filed a second 
election petition for system operators, and the parties agreed 
that the Board could rely on the record from the February 2017 
hearing.  Incorporating the reasoning and findings from the 
prior decision, an Acting Regional Director directed the 
Company to conduct a second election.  This time, the system 
operators voted to join the bargaining unit, and the Regional 
Director certified the Union as their representative.   
 
3 The Company’s dispatchers, who work alongside the system 
operators to monitor and prioritize acute service needs for 
individual customers, are among those employees represented 
by the Union. 
4 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11).   
5 Mars Home for Youth v. NLRB, 666 F.3d 850, 853 (3d Cir. 
2011) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 2(3), 152(3)).  
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The Company petitioned for review of the Regional 
Director’s decision.  The Board agreed to review the Regional 
Director’s decision with respect to whether system operators 
have the authority, using independent judgment, (1) to assign 
employees to places or (2) responsibly to direct employees.  A 
three-member panel of the Board, with one member dissenting, 
affirmed the Regional Director’s decision and adopted his 
factual findings.   
 
The Company refused to bargain, and the Union filed 
an unfair-labor-practice charge with the Board.  The Board 
issued a complaint alleging that the Company’s refusal to 
bargain violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.6    The 
Company admitted its refusal to bargain but challenged the 
Union’s certification as bargaining agent on the ground that 
system operators are supervisors under the Act.  The Board 
found that the Company’s refusal to bargain violated the Act 
and ordered the Company to cease and desist from refusing to 
recognize the Union.  
 
The Company timely petitioned this Court for review of 
the Board’s decision, and the Board cross-applied for 





The Board had jurisdiction over the unfair-labor-
practice proceeding under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a).  We have 
 
6 See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (a)(1).  
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jurisdiction to review the Board’s decision and order pursuant 
to 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f). 
 
“Our ‘review of orders of the Board is highly 
deferential.’”7  We “accept the Board’s factual findings and the 
reasonable inferences derived from those findings if they are 
‘supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as 
a whole.’”8  “Where the Board has adopted the Regional 
Director’s findings, we perform our substantial evidence 
review of the Regional Director’s findings.”9  Substantial 
evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”10  “The 
Board’s legal determinations are subject to plenary review, but 
‘with due deference to the Board’s expertise in labor 
matters.’”11  We have recognized that “determinations 
 
7 Coral Harbor Rehab. and Nursing Ctr. v. NLRB, 945 F.3d 
763, 767 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Trimm Assocs., Inc. v. NLRB, 
351 F.3d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
8 MCPC, Inc. v. NLRB, 813 F.3d 475, 482 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)).  
9 NLRB v. New Vista Nursing & Rehab., 870 F.3d 113, 122 (3d 
Cir. 2017). 
10 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 853 (quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Citizens Publ’g & Printing Co. v. NLRB, 263 F.3d 
224, 232 (3d Cir. 2001)).  
11 Id. (quoting NLRB v. St. George Warehouse, Inc., 645 F.3d 
666, 671 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
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A.  Standard of Proof 
 
The Company first contends that both the Board and the 
Regional Director held it to an improperly heightened standard 
of proof.  The Company agrees that, as the party asserting 
supervisor status, it bears the burden of proving supervisory 
authority by a preponderance of the evidence.13    The Regional 
Director’s decision correctly recited that standard and found 
that the Company had not satisfied it, and the Board affirmed.  
 
The Company nevertheless objects to: (1) the Board’s 
and Regional Director’s invocation of the Board’s 
longstanding principle that the proponent of supervisor status 
fails to meet its burden when the evidence “is in conflict or 
otherwise inconclusive,” which the Company says imposes a 
species of the summary-judgment standard;14 and (2) the Board 
majority’s use of the words “clear” and “unclear” to describe 
aspects of the record, which the Company reads as imposing a 
 
12 Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).  
13 See NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711-
12 (2001); In re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686, 
694 (2006).  
14 App. 5 n.3 (citing Phelps Cmty. Med. Ctr., 295 N.L.R.B. 486, 
490 (1989)), 21.  
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clear-and-convincing standard.15  The Board responds that we 
lack jurisdiction under Section 10(e) of the Act to consider 
these arguments because the Company failed to raise them 
before the Board.16  We agree. 
 
Beginning with the Company’s first argument, the 
closest the Company came to raising this issue before the 
Board was a broad objection to the “evidentiary principles” and 
“unduly restrictive approach” that the Regional Director 
applied.17  In the final pages of the Company’s briefing before 
the Board, it argued that the Regional Director’s decision 
“reveals the Board’s increasing reliance on doctrines and 
evidentiary principles regarding Section 2(11) authority that 
are irreconcilable with the Act, which preclude a finding of 
supervisor status even when the record contains dispositive 
evidence of Section 2(11) authority.”18  The briefing then 
block-quotes nearly two full paragraphs of the Regional 
Director’s decision reciting eight different legal standards 
applicable in supervisor cases.  In the middle of this list is the 
 
15 App. 5 n.3. 
16 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (“No objection that has not been 
urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court, 
unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be 
excused because of extraordinary circumstances.”); Woelke & 
Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 666 (1982) 
(“[T]he Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to review 
objections that were not urged before the Board . . . .”). 
17 A.R. 623-24, 703-04. 
18 A.R. 623, 703. 
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principle that “[w]here the evidence is in conflict or otherwise 
inconclusive on particular indicia of supervisory authority, the 
Board will find that supervisory status has not been 
established.”19  The briefing then argues that “Congress did not 
include any of the above qualifications in the definition of 
supervisor status,” and urges the Board to hold that the quoted 
rules “are inconsistent with Section 2(11), on its face, and . . . 
[to] abandon those principles and overrule those decisions that 
have articulated and applied them.”20  
  
This all-purpose challenge to what the Company 
described to the Board as “an array of doctrines” does not 
sufficiently raise the instant standard-of-proof argument to 
preserve it for our review.21  “In order to meet the requirements 
of Section 10(e), an objection must be specific enough to place 
the agency on notice of the party’s objections.”22  The 
Company’s only reference to the now objected-to “in conflict” 
principle, buried in a block quotation among seven other rules 
and advancing the nebulous assertion that all eight doctrines 
are collectively “inconsistent with Section 2(11),” is barely 
more than a generalized exception to the Regional Director’s 
entire statement of the law.23  Even if we read these two pages 
 
19 A.R. 623 (quoting App. 21), 703 (quoting App. 21). 
20 A.R. 623-24, 704. 
21 A.R. 593, 669.  
22 Int’l Brotherhood Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 973 F.3d 451, 460 
(5th Cir. 2020) (“Entergy IV”). 
23 See Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253, 255-56 
(1943) (holding that “general objection[s]” do not “afford[] the 
11 
 
as a specific challenge to the “in conflict” principle, the 
Company now objects to it on different grounds.24  The 
Company’s earlier objection, based on different reasons rooted 
in a different provision of the Act, could not have afforded the 
Board “adequate notice of the basis for the objection” now 
asserted.25 
 
Board opportunity to consider on the merits questions to be 
urged upon review of its order”).   
24 Compare Company Br. 23, 25-27, 30 (arguing that the “in 
conflict” principle imposes a heightened summary-judgment-
like standard inconsistent with the preponderance standard 
mandated by Section 10(c) of the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)) 
with A.R. 622-24, 702-04 (arguing that the eight quoted 
principles are inconsistent with the definition of supervisor 
status located in Section 2(11) of the Act, see 29 U.S.C. 
§ 152(11)). 
25 NLRB v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 832 F.3d 432, 437 (3d Cir. 
2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).  The Company’s 
reliance on this Court’s decision in FedEx Freight is 
unavailing.  In that case, we found an objection preserved 
where the petition before the Board included a footnote raising 
the objection “largely for the reasons cited in” a Board 
member’s earlier dissenting opinion.  Id. at 437-38.  A 
concurrence in the Board’s decision on review 
“acknowledge[d]” the objection, which, we explained, 
“indicate[d] this footnote provided sufficient notice” to the 
Board.  Id. at 438.  Here, the Company’s briefing before the 
Board similarly invoked “the views expressed by former 
Chairman Miscimarra in Buchanan Marine and other cases”—
but in support of an entirely separate objection that the 
Company has since abandoned.  A.R. 622, 702-03.  Indeed, the 
12 
 
 We likewise find forfeited the Company’s second 
standard-of-proof objection to the Board’s observations that 
the record lacked “clear evidence” on a particular indicium of 
supervisor status and was elsewhere “unclear.”26  The 
Company did not make this objection before the Board nor did 
it seek the Board’s reconsideration on this or any basis and 
offers no explanation for its failure to do so.27 
 
 
arguably incorporated reasoning does not take issue with the 
“in conflict” principle at all, but instead proposes an alternative 
three-factor test for supervisor status.  See Buchanan Marine, 
L.P., 363 N.L.R.B. No. 58, at *4 (Dec. 2, 2015) (Miscimarra, 
dissenting); Chi LakeWood Health, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 10, at *1 
(Dec. 28, 2016) (Miscimarra, dissenting).  And, unlike in 
FedEx Freight, the Board’s decision here lacks any 
“acknowledg[ment]” indicating that the Board had notice of 
this objection.  See FedEx Freight, 832 F.3d at 438. 
26 App. 5 n.3. 
27 See Woelke, 456 U.S. at 666 (holding that a party’s failure to 
“petition for reconsideration or rehearing” of the Board’s 
reasoning “prevents consideration of the question by the 
courts”); NLRB v. Konig, 79 F.3d 354, 360 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(“[Petitioner’s] failure to raise the argument, and certainly its 
failure to file a petition for reconsideration, deprives this court 
of jurisdiction to address this question under section 10(e) of 
the NLRA.”).   
13 
 
 Section 10(e)’s “exhaustion requirement is 
jurisdictional.”28  Because the Company did not raise its 
standard-of-proof objections before the Board, and because the 
Company does not assert any “extraordinary circumstances” 
that would excuse that failure, we lack jurisdiction to consider 
those objections.29  Of course, in reviewing the merits of the 
Board’s determination that the Company’s system operators 
are not supervisors, we take the preponderance standard “to 
mean what [it] say[s], and [we] conduct substantial-evidence 
review on that basis.”30  But we will not take up the Company’s 
invitation to treat the Board’s weighing of the evidence as a 
preliminary legal issue requiring plenary rather than deferential 
 
28 1621 Route 22 W. Operating Co. v. NLRB, 825 F.3d 128, 
139 (3d Cir. 2016). 
29 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).  We also lack jurisdiction to consider the 
Company’s objection to the Regional Director’s statement that 
“[t]he Board has an obligation not to construe the statutory 
language too broadly because the individual found to be a 
supervisor is denied the employee rights that are protected 
under the Act,” App. 21, based on the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 
1134, 1142 (2018).  The Company failed to raise this argument 
or cite Encino before the Board (in briefing submitted after the 
Encino decision) and does not defend its failure to do so.   
30 Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 
376-77 (1998).  
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review where the Board was not first afforded the opportunity 
to consider the objection.31   
 
B.  Substantial Evidence 
  
To determine whether an individual is a supervisor 
under Section 2(11) of the Act, we apply a “three-part test.”32 
 
Employees are statutory supervisors if (1) they 
hold the authority to engage in any 1 of the 12 
listed supervisory functions [in Section 2(11)]; 
(2) their exercise of such authority is not of a 
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the 
use of independent judgment, and (3) their 
authority is held in the interest of the employer.33 
 
Only the first two prongs are disputed here.  The Company 
asserts that system operators are supervisors because they use 
independent judgment to exercise two statutory indicia of 
supervisory authority: (1) they assign other employees, and (2) 
they responsibly direct other employees.34   
 
 
31 See FedEx Freight, 832 F.3d at 449-50 (Jordan, J., 
concurring); Edward St. Daycare Ctr., Inc. v. NLRB, 189 F.3d 
40, 44, 52 (1st Cir. 1999).  
32 New Vista, 870 F.3d at 117. 
33 Ky. River, 532 U.S. at 713 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 
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The Board majority concluded that system operators 
possessed neither authority.  “Whether someone is a supervisor 
is a question of fact, and thus [the Board’s determination] will 
be upheld if it [is] supported by substantial evidence.”35  We 
apply the Board’s interpretations of the terms “assign,” 
“responsibly direct,” and “independent judgment,” which are 




Assignment includes “the act of designating an 
employee to a place (such as a location, department, or wing), 
[or] appointing an employee to a time (such as a shift or 
overtime period).”37  “[T]he decision or effective 
recommendation to affect one of these [assignments] . . . can 
be a supervisory function.”38  The Company argues that system 
operators (a) assign field employees to places based on their 
prioritization of work, which results in crews being dispatched 
to job sites, and (b) assign field employees to times based on 
their role in determining when work is cancelled and 
rescheduled and when work requiring overtime pay may be 
necessary.  Neither argument is persuasive. 
 
 
35 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 853. 
36 See id. at 854 n.2, 855 n.3. 
37 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 689.  
38 Id.  
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a.  Assignment to Places 
 
The record supports the Board’s and Regional 
Director’s findings that system operators prioritize Company 
resources but do not assign individual field employees to 
places.  System operators determine the need for work at a 
given location, then they or the Company’s dispatchers request 
that a field supervisor send a crew to that location.  The 
Company argues that the fact that system operators’ 
prioritization decisions have downstream effects on where 
field employees end up requires a finding that they assign field 
employees to places and that the opposite conclusion is 
inconsistent with the Board’s decision in Entergy Mississippi, 
Inc. (“Entergy III”).39  We disagree. 
 
In Entergy III, the Board held that transmission and 
distribution dispatchers at a Mississippi electric utility 
company were supervisors because they assigned field 
employees to places using independent judgment, relying in 
part on the dispatchers’ exercise of discretion in prioritizing 
resources during outages.40  Here, the Board majority 
distinguished Entergy III on the ground that, in contrast to the 
Mississippi employer, the Company “failed to meet its burden 
of proving that the System Operators possess the authority to 
assign . . . employees within the meaning of Section 2(11),” 
then explained the Company’s evidentiary shortcomings.41  
 
39 367 N.L.R.B. No. 109 (Mar. 21, 2019). 
40 Id. at *4-5. 
41 App. 5 & n.3. 
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We agree with the Board that Entergy III does not control the 
outcome in this case. 
 
First, Entergy III does not provide a square holding on 
the issue of assignment-to-place authority.  In the Entergy 
cases, the Board assumed the dispatchers could assign 
employees to places—which the union did not challenge—and 
its decisions instead turned on the issue of independent 
judgment.42  The Board clarified that Entergy III should not be 
read to hold that “prioritization of outages by itself establishes 
the dispatchers’ supervisory authority,” since the “allocation of 
resources and prioritization of outages are not supervisory 
indicia set forth in Sec[tion] 2(11).”43  Rather, the Board’s 
 
42 See Entergy Miss., Inc., 357 N.L.R.B. 2150, 2156 (2011) 
(“Entergy I”) (“Even assuming [dispatchers’] temporary 
assignment [of employees] to a place of work constitutes 
assignment . . . the record does not establish that the dispatchers 
assign . . . using independent judgment.”); Entergy Miss., Inc. 
v. NLRB, 810 F.3d 287, 298 (5th Cir. 2015) (“Entergy II”) 
(vacating and remanding Entergy I solely on independent 
judgment issue); Entergy III, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at *5 (on 
remand, finding supervisory status because “[1] the dispatchers 
undisputedly assign employees to places, and [2] these places 
are selected based on the exercise of independent judgment” 
(emphasis added)); Entergy IV, 973 F.3d at 460-62 (affirming 
Entergy III but expressing concern that the Board failed 
meaningfully to engage with the scope of the dispatchers’ 
purported assignment authority, noting the union’s forfeiture 
of that argument). 
43 Entergy III, 367 N.L.R.B. No. 109, at *5 n.7 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
18 
 
consideration of the dispatchers’ resource-prioritization 
discretion supported only its independent-judgment finding.44  
Accordingly, we do not read Entergy III to require the Board 
to find assignment authority wherever a purported supervisor 
prioritizes resources during outages, as the Board explicitly 
stated that it was not so holding.45  
 
Second, the record supports the Board’s conclusion here 
that the system operators cannot assign field employees to 
 
44 See id.  
45 We disagree with the Company’s assertion at oral argument 
that our distinguishing Entergy III on this basis would violate 
the principle that “a reviewing court, in dealing with a 
determination or judgment which an administrative agency 
alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such 
action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency.”  SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947).  We uphold the 
Board’s order on the ground that the Company failed to 
produce sufficient evidence that system operators possess 
supervisory authority—the precise ground on which the Board 
based its decision and distinguished Entergy III.  Our rejection 
of the Company’s characterization of Entergy III as finding 
assignment authority based on analogous facts merely 
reinforces our agreement with the Board majority that a 
different record here warrants a different outcome.  The 
Chenery doctrine is therefore inapplicable.  Cf. Slaughter v. 
NLRB, 794 F.2d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1986).  
19 
 
places.46  The parties’ primary factual dispute concerns the 
extent to which system operators can require—rather than 
simply request—that crews dispatch to a particular location.  
The Board majority determined that the Company failed to 
meet its burden on this point, reasoning as follows:  
 
While some Employer witnesses testified that 
System Operators have the authority to prioritize 
jobs, Senior System Operator Jim Luciani’s 
testimony disputed the assertion that System 
Operators have the authority to command 
Dispatchers, Field Supervisors, and Work 
Coordinators to dispatch employees to a specific 
location or call them back, apart from providing 
input as to which locations may be of higher 
priority.  Rather, it would appear from his 
testimony that the Dispatchers, Field 
Supervisors, and Work Coordinators are tasked 
with handling both the regular dispatch of crews 
and work assignments as well as dispatch in the 
event of regular or multiple outages.47   
 
The Board also adopted the Regional Director’s factual 
determinations, which included a square finding that “it is the 
 
46 See Entergy IV, 973 F.3d at 458 n.5 (“[T]here is no 
categorical rule that all dispatchers must have the same 
supervisory status.”). 
47 App. 5 n.3. 
20 
 
Field Supervisor who assigns employees to [their] tasks, and 
the System Operators do not have the authority to do so.”48 
 
Substantial evidence supports these determinations.  
Luciani testified that he lacked the authority to direct a field 
supervisor to send a crew to a location, stating that such 
authority is “above [his] level” and that at most he could “ask 
really nicely.”49  Two management witnesses—Michael 
Sullivan, a vice president for the Company’s parent 
corporation, and Jay Davis, the system operators’ supervisor—
likewise acknowledged field supervisors’ intervening 
responsibility for selecting crews for dispatch.  Both the Board 
and the Regional Director considered evidence that system 
operators have the authority to cancel previously scheduled 
work and reasonably concluded that such evidence did not 
establish that system operators had the power to assign or 
 
48 App. 31.  The Regional Director’s discussion elsewhere of 
system operators’ “authority to direct Field Supervisors to 
assign crews” only on occasions where “there is a 
disagreement as to whether a field crew should be assigned,” 
does not undermine this square finding, particularly in light of 
his observation that the record did not contain clear evidence 
of “how often or in what circumstances this has occurred.”  
App. 27.  On the contrary, the Regional Director repeatedly 
found that the authority to assign field employees to jobs 
resides with field supervisors, and that field supervisors can 
refuse system operators’ requests.  The Board majority echoed 
this finding that the record lacked evidence of an occasion on 
which a system operator’s recommendation to make an 
assignment was followed.    
49 A.R. 233-34.  
21 
 
reassign those employees to places, particularly when weighed 
against Luciani’s testimony that he lacked that authority. 
 
The Company argues that the Board ignored Luciani’s 
responses to hypothetical questions about whether he can 
direct a field employee to report to Company priorities during 
an emergency; to one question he responded, “[s]ure, I can tell 
him can you go to the hospital next,” and to the other he 
explained that he “may tell them to go.”50  The Company also 
marshals conclusory testimony from Sullivan and Davis that 
system operators have the authority to assign a crew or to direct 
a field supervisor to assign a crew.  Applying deferential 
substantial-evidence review, we cannot conclude that these 
hypotheticals and conclusory statements undermine the 
Board’s decision in light of other record evidence, including 
Luciani’s testimony that he lacks the authority to assign or 
select workers for jobs, that he can only “provide input” into 
such decisions, and that other Company employees—namely, 
field supervisors and work coordinators—assign work for the 
field.51   
 
The Company also objects to the Board’s reasoning that 
the record lacked “clear evidence of a specific occasion when 
a System Operator held over crews, assigned them to a job, or 
made a recommendation to do so that was then followed.”52  
 
50 A.R. 225, 240-41.  
51 A.R. 230, 239-40; see Golden Crest Healthcare Ctr., 348 
N.L.R.B. 727, 731 (2006) (“[P]urely conclusory evidence is 
not sufficient to establish supervisory status.”).   
52 App. 5 n.3. 
22 
 
The Company correctly observes that the statutory supervisor 
designation turns on the existence of supervisory authority—
not the frequency of its exercise.53  However, in NLRB v. New 
Vista Nursing & Rehabilitation, we drew a clear distinction 
between cases in which there are few examples of the exercise 
of supervisory authority—which does not undercut the 
existence of that authority—and cases in which there are zero 
examples—which does.54  We explained that, in the former 
category of cases, “whether the employees exercise their 
supervisory authority only a few times (or even just one time)” 
is insufficient to disprove supervisor status.55  By contrast, in 
cases where “‘the record [does] not reveal any instances’” of 
the exercise of supervisory authority, that authority could be 
“merely ‘a speculative possibility, which absent 
demonstration, is simply ‘paper power.’’”56   
 
 
53 See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (defining supervisor as “any 
individual having authority . . .”); NLRB v. Prime Energy Ltd. 
P’ship, 224 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[O]nce the 
existence of supervisory authority is established, the degree or 
frequency of its exercise is of little consequence.” (alteration 
in original; quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
54 870 F.3d 113, 131-33 (3d Cir. 2017). 
55 Id. at 132-33. 
56 Id. at 131-32 (emphasis in original) (first quoting NLRB v. 
Attleboro Assocs., Ltd., 176 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 1999); then 
quoting Beverly Enters.-Mass., Inc. v. NLRB, 165 F.3d 960, 
964 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). 
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The Board majority’s reasoning that the record lacked 
evidence of any occasion on which a system operator exercised 
his purported authority to assign employees to a place and 
construal of the absence of such evidence against the party 
asserting supervisor status was therefore permissible.57  The 
cases on which the Company relies are all of the former 
category or are otherwise inapposite.58   
 
Because substantial evidence supports the Board’s 
conclusion that system operators lack the authority to assign 
employees to a place under Section 2(11), we need not reach 
the question of whether they exercise independent judgment.59 
 
57 See Beverly Enters.-Mass., 165 F.3d at 961 (“While the 
exercise of supervisory authority is not always necessary to 
establish that authority is possessed, the repeated failure to 
exercise putative authority in circumstances where such 
exercise would be appropriate can be evidence that the 
authority is more imagined than real.”). 
58 See, e.g., New Vista, 870 F.3d at 134 (holding that the Board 
applied the wrong legal standard where it “rel[ied] heavily on 
the fact that the [workers] did not frequently exercise their 
alleged supervisory power”); Prime Energy, 224 F.3d at 210 
(“The mere fact that the regional director found only one 
instance where [the purported supervisor exercised the 
authority to discipline] is hardly a reasonable basis to conclude 
that the authority was lacking.”). 
59 See NLRB v. NSTAR Elec. Co., 798 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2015) 
(“[I]t is only when a worker performs a listed supervisor 
function that we then must determine whether its exercise 




b.  Assignment to Times 
 
The Company also asserts that system operators can 
assign employees to a time, again relying on the relationship 
between system operators’ prioritization of projects and the 
assignment of field employees to those projects via the 
intervening decisions of field supervisors.  The Regional 
Director found that system operators’ determinations about 
resource allocation can affect “how long field employees are at 
a particular jobsite,” including in ways that would constitute 
overtime.60  However, system operators do not schedule shifts 
or assign overtime, which is the purview of field supervisors, 
and they “cannot require field employees to stay to finish 
work.”61  In affirming the Regional Director’s determination 
that system operators do not possess supervisory assignment 
authority, the Board majority observed that there was no 
evidence of an occasion on which a system operator “held over 
crews.”62   
 
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s and Regional 
Director’s findings, including Luciani’s testimony that he 
cannot instruct crews to work overtime nor direct a field 
supervisor to send a replacement crew.  The Company relies 
on management testimony that is both conclusory and 
contradicted by Luciani, which is insufficient to justify remand 
under substantial-evidence review.  The Company’s other 
 
60 App. 26. 
61 App. 28. 
62 App. 5 n.3. 
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evidence supports the undisputed assertion that system 
operators can cancel work.  But, as we have already explained, 
the conclusion that the downstream effects of system 
operators’ prioritization decisions on field employees’ 
schedules do not alone establish Section 2(11) assignment 
authority is both supported by the record and consistent with 
the Board’s decisions in other cases.63   
 
Because the Regional Director’s determination that 
system operators cannot assign field employees to times is 
supported by substantial evidence, we do not address the issue 
of independent judgment.64    
 
2.  Responsible Direction 
 
For oversight of other employees to constitute 
responsible direction, “the person directing and performing the 
oversight of the employee must be accountable for the 
performance of the task by the other, such that some adverse 
 
63 See NSTAR, 798 F.3d at 15-16 (affirming finding that 
purported supervisors lacked the authority to assign to a time 
where they held only the authority to sequence work and could 
“request, but [not] require, that field employees stay past the 
end of their shifts to finish a job”); Entergy I, 357 N.L.R.B. at 
2156-57 (finding no assignment-to-time authority where 
witness “summarily testified that dispatchers can require field 
employees to remain on the job and work overtime until 
released, but he failed to particularize his testimony, such as by 
describing actual incidents”), aff’d in relevant part, Entergy II, 
810 F.3d at 298. 
64 See supra n.59.  
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consequence may befall the one providing the oversight if the 
tasks performed by the employee are not performed 
properly.”65  “The putative supervisor must be at risk of 
suffering adverse consequences for the actual performance of 
others, not his own performance in overseeing others.”66   
 
System operators guide field employees in their 
performance of de-energizing equipment by preparing 
switching instructions, based on guidance from a manual, and 
confirming the steps to field employees over the phone.  Once 
the field employee performs the steps, he “tags” the equipment 
to indicate that it has been de-energized.67  System operators 
do not monitor the switching process firsthand; instead, on-site 
crew leaders oversee field employees’ performance of the 
steps.     
 
The Regional Director determined that system operators 
do not responsibly direct field employees’ switching 
performance because, while system operators “are held 
accountable for their own conduct in failing to communicate 
properly with the field employees,” there is “no evidence that 
the System Operators are held accountable for the field 
employees’ performance or that they suffer adverse 
consequences if the field employees perform poorly.”68  
 
65 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 854 (quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 691-92). 
66 Id.   
67 A.R. 127, 184.   
68 App. 28, 32.  
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Substantial evidence supports this conclusion, and the 
Company’s three primary evidentiary arguments are 
insufficient to show the accountability necessary for 
responsible direction. 
 
 The Company first points to an incident in which a field 
crew timed out of a location and a system operator failed to 
request that a replacement crew be dispatched, for which the 
system operator received a “verbal censure.”69  But this 
incident did not involve any mistake by a field employee and, 
indeed, Davis testified that the system operator received a 
censure because he “did not follow up with getting another 
crew to complete that work.”70  The evidence therefore 
supports the Regional Director’s determination that system 
operators are evaluated “on their own performance,” which 
does not support a finding of responsible direction.71   
 
 
69 App. 28; A.R. 190.  
70 A.R. 189.  
71 App. 32; see Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 854 (affirming finding 
of no responsible direction where purported supervisors were 
“disciplined for their own failings”); NSTAR, 798 F.3d at 18 
(affirming finding that purported supervisor did not 
responsibly direct field employees where he was held 
accountable “for how he did his own work and not for how the 
field employee did his”); Entergy II, 810 F.3d at 296 
(“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the Board’s determination 
that dispatchers are accountable only for their own mistakes[, 
a]nd under Oakwood, this is sufficient to show that dispatchers 
do not ‘responsibly direct’ field employees.”). 
28 
 
A second incident involved a field employee who 
discovered an equipment failure and, after troubleshooting, 
proceeded with the switching process without contacting the 
system operator.  The incident resulted in a change to the 
switching instructions to include a step requiring additional 
equipment readings.  This example lacks the prospect of 
“actual accountability” required for responsible direction, as 
there is no evidence, including in the incident report and in 
Davis’s testimony, of any consequences for system operators 
other than coaching on the revised instructions.72   
 
Third, the Company relies on evidence that system 
operators’ performance evaluations account for a 
companywide goal of fewer than twenty-five permit-and-tag 
(“P&T”) errors in the switching process—an overall 
performance standard that affects the unit collectively.  The 
evaluation forms show that system operators have a team 
safety goal of “[l]ess than 25 regional P&T incidents” as well 
as an individual goal of “no incidents due to System Operator 
Error.”73  One evaluation form shows that the team P&T goal 
was not met, but there is no indication that the system operator 
was disciplined in any way for the performance of a field 
employee under his direction.  Davis testified only summarily 
that “if the field . . . is not performing well, the system 
operators take a hit on their evaluations.”74  The inclusion of a 
 
72 Golden Crest, 348 N.L.R.B. at 731 (requiring, for 
responsible direction, “evidence of actual or prospective 
consequences to . . . terms and conditions of employment”). 
73 A.R. 521.   
74 A.R. 186. 
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team goal accounting for other employees’ performances does 
not establish that system operators in fact face the prospect of 
adverse consequences, as is required for responsible 
direction.75  Substantial evidence therefore supports the 
Regional Director’s conclusion that system operators do not 
responsibly direct field employees.76  
 
75 See NSTAR, 798 F.3d at 19 (affirming finding that employer 
failed to show that purported supervisors’ bonuses, which 
reflected “the manner in which they have managed projects in 
the field[,] . . . suffice[d] to make [their] direction of field 
employees into ‘responsible’ direction” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  For this reason, the Regional Director’s 
arguably erroneous statement that field employees’ 
“performance standard of fewer than 25 errors . . . does not 
apply to System Operators” does not undermine his ultimate 
finding that “there is no evidence that System Operators are 
held accountable for those errors.”  App. 32 (emphasis added).  
Remand on this factual finding alone “would be an idle and 
useless formality.”  NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 
759, 766 n.6 (1969).   
76 The Company also repurposes its assignment claim to argue 
that system operators’ prioritization of field needs, such as 
when there are multiple outages, constitutes responsible 
direction.  The Company relies on W. Penn Power Co. v. 
NLRB, 337 F.2d 993 (3d Cir. 1964), which predated the 
Board’s Oakwood Healthcare decision providing the operative 
interpretation of “responsibly to direct” and which relied 
heavily on the purported supervisors’ job description, a factor 
that is no longer of controlling importance under Oakwood.  
See Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 690 n.24 (“[J]ob 
titles and descriptions prepared by employers are not 
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Even assuming system operators responsibly directed 
field employees’ performance of switching steps, substantial 
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Company 
failed to show that “writing switching instructions constitutes 
independent judgment,” since “these instructions are guided by 
a manual and are ordered by safety concerns.”77  An individual 
exercises independent judgment “when he acts or recommends 
action ‘free of the control of others and form[s] an opinion or 
evaluation by discerning and comparing data.’”78  “[A] 
judgment is not independent if it is dictated or controlled by 
detailed instructions” that do not “allow for discretionary 
choices.”79  Luciani testified that Company manuals 
circumscribe switching steps for de-energizing equipment, and 
system operators effectively translate those steps into an 
instruction format.  The Company produces no evidence 
undermining this testimony.  Because these manuals dictate the 
 
controlling; rather the Board looks to the authority actually 
possessed and the work actually performed by the alleged 
supervisor.”); see also NSTAR, 798 F.3d at 11 n.8 (rejecting 
employer’s reliance on pre-Oakwood cases).  The Company’s 
argument that dispatchers’ job descriptions state that they are 
under the direction of system operators suffers from the same 
failing, particularly in light of evidence that system operators 
lack actual authority to direct dispatchers regarding field 
employees’ assignments. 
77 App. 5 n.3. 
78 Mars Home, 666 F.3d at 854 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 692-93). 
79 Oakwood Healthcare, 348 N.L.R.B. at 693. 
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ordering of switching steps, the Board permissibly concluded 
that system operators’ purported direction of field employees 




We have considered the Company’s remaining 
arguments and find them without merit.  Because the Board’s 
determination that the system operators are not supervisors 
within the meaning of the Act is supported by substantial 
evidence, we will deny the Company’s petition for review and 
grant the Board’s cross-application for enforcement.   
